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1. Devoted agents 
 
If we read philosophical and psychological literature on human motivation, we are confronted with 
long lists of things that people want.  We want happiness and freedom from pain; acceptance by 
groups; a sense of achievement; perhaps self-determination or self-actualization; perhaps a sense of 
power.1  But there is something that often goes unmentioned in these lists: we seek a form of 
devotion.   
 
Consider a famous excerpt from George Orwell’s 1940 review of Mein Kampf.  Orwell warns 
that Hitler  
 
has grasped the falsity of the hedonistic attitude toward life.  Nearly all western thought since 
the last war… has assumed tacitly that human beings desire nothing beyond ease, security, 
and avoidance of pain…. [but] human beings don’t only want comfort, safety, short working-
hours, hygiene, birth-control and, in general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, 
want struggle and self-sacrifice… Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging 
way, have said to people ‘I offer you a good time,’ Hitler has said to them ‘I offer you 
struggle, danger and death,’ and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet.  (Orwell 
1968: 14) 
Anyone who considers the rise of nationalist politics, extremism, and jihadist movements in our time 
can see that these tendencies are not mere historical curiosities.  It’s certainly true that human beings 
are moved by considerations of happiness, comfort, and so forth. But we also seek something else, 
something for which we are at times willing to set aside these other ends, something for which we 
will undertake toil, struggle, violence, opposition, and self-sacrifice.  We seek something to which we 
can devote ourselves.2 
Consider three examples. 
 
 
1 Representative works from empirical psychology include Maslow (1962), Deci and Ryan (1985), Baumeister and Vohs 
(2007), Lopez and Snyder (2011), and McClleland et al (1989). 
2 We might wonder which factor comes first in the order of explanation.  I will be suggesting that we seek a form of 
devotion and that this craving for devotion explains some cases in which we are attracted to toil, struggle, violence, and 
so on.  But an alternative explanation would be that we seek (for example) violence for its own sake, and are attracted to 
devotion insofar as devotion enables or justifies this violence.  The examples I give below won’t decide this issue; they 
are merely suggestive. 
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~ ~ ~ 
In the summer of 2016, protestors began gathering at Standing Rock, North Dakota.  They objected 
to the federal government’s plan to construct a large oil pipeline underneath a section of the 
Missouri River that lies only a half-mile from the border of the Standing Rock Indian Reservation.  
The protestors feared contamination of the Reservation’s water supply as well as destruction of areas 
of cultural and religious import: as Standing Rock’s Historic Preservation Officer Ladonna Bravebull 
Allard put it, “if we allow an oil company to dig through and destroy our histories, our ancestors, 
our hearts and souls as a people, is that not genocide?” (Allard 2016). 
In October, the protestors found themselves confronted by hundreds of police officers and national 
guardsmen, marching in columns behind five armored military vehicles.  Brandishing clubs and 
shields, firing rubber bullets and tear gas, armed with concussion grenades and tasers, the officers 
advanced on the protestors.  142 protestors were arrested, many injured.  A month later, the process 
was repeated: columns of officials once again marched toward the protestors, this time spraying 
them with water cannons in subzero temperatures, firing rubber bullets, and allegedly using 
concussion grenades.   
As images of peaceful protestors confronted by militarized police forces circulated through the 
media, many viewers were shocked and appalled.  Some of them organized: Michael A Wood Jr and 
Wes Clark Jr formed a group called Veterans for Standing Rock.  Their goal was to join the 
protestors and provide some measure of protection by using themselves as human shields.  Initially 
expecting relatively minor turnout, Wood and Clark were surprised to find that over 2000 US 
military veterans turned up at Standing Rock.   
What attracted these veterans?  “You might as well die for something that means something,” said 
Vincent Emanuele, a 32 year old former Marine (Healy 2016).  Emanuele had served in Iraq and had 
come to regard that war as futile.  He sought something more, something that would give his life 
significance and direction, some weighty cause to which he could sacrifice himself: “A lot of people 
here are willing to sacrifice their body, willing to give their life,” he noted.  And his potential sacrifice 
didn’t go unnoticed: the tribal chairman, Dave Archambault II, said “You guys are very symbolic… 
What you’re doing is sacred” (Healy 2016). 
Most of the veterans had no direct connection to the area.  They were drawn by something else.  
“You might as well die for something that means something” (Healy 2016). 
 
~ ~ ~ 
 
Until early 2015, Kadiza Sultana, Amira Abase and Shamima Begum had been living ordinary, 
comfortable lives in London.  These fifteen- and sixteen-year old girls had been doing well in school, 
earning praise from their teachers, and enjoying their popularity: “they were the girls you wanted to 
be like,” said a student from the grade below theirs (Bennhold 2015).  By conventional standards 
they were flourishing.  Yet in February 2015, the three students left their homes, flew to Turkey, and 
made their way across the border into Syria.  There, they joined ISIS.  They were quickly married off 
to ISIS fighters and began having children.  They were also confronted with all the horrors of life 
under ISIS.  In a 2019 interview with the Times of London, Shamima Begum said, “When I saw my 
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first severed head in a bin it didn’t faze me at all… It was from a captured fighter seized on the 
battlefield, an enemy of Islam. I thought only of what he would have done to a Muslim woman if he 
had the chance” (Mueller 2019).  Begum reportedly joined al-Hisba, ISIS’s female morality police, 
which was known for inflicting brutal punishments: violations such as using makeup, traveling 
without a male companion, or wearing the wrong clothing were punished with 40-60 lashes.   
 
What led these teenagers to ISIS?  An earlier article offered this account:  
 
Asked by their families during sporadic phone calls and exchanges on social media platforms 
why they had run away, the girls spoke of leaving behind an immoral society to search for 
religious virtue and meaning. In one Twitter message, nine days before they left Britain, 
Amira wrote, “I feel like I don’t belong in this era.” (Bennhold 2015).   
 
They sought something more, something that would give them purpose and direction, something 
that the tedium of their ordinary lives in London did not provide.  And ISIS appeared to offer just 
that.  A few months before they left, ISIS’ online magazine Dabiq published this call: 
 
The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being 
nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long 
slumber in the darkness of neglect—the time has come for them to rise. The time has come 
for the ummah of Muhammad (peace be upon him) to wake up from its sleep, remove the 
garments of dishonor, and shake off the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for the era of 
lamenting and moaning has gone, and the dawn of honor has emerged anew. The sun of 
jihad has risen. The glad tidings of good are shining. Triumph looms on the horizon. The 
signs of victory have appeared.3 
And the calls continued: the twelfth issue of Dabiq refers to its followers as “the brothers who have 
refused to live a life of humiliation” (Al-Ushan 2015).  The ninth issue claims that ISIS has 
established a true Caliphate, with “honor and pride for the Muslim and humiliation and degradation 
for the kaffir [apostates]” (Al-Muhajirah 2015).  
The conditions that these teenagers faced were perhaps not what they expected: confronted with the 
collapse of the Islamic State and the deaths of all three of her children, Shamima Begum is now 
trying to return to London.  And yet something of that longing for purpose remains in her: “I don’t 
regret coming here,” she says (Loyd 2019). 
 
Kadiza Sultana, Amira Abase and Shamima Begum weren’t alone.  A July 2018 study counted over 
41,000 foreigners who travelled to Syria or Iraq to join ISIS.  Around 19,000 were from the Middle 
East, 13,000 were from Europe, and 300 were from the United States.4  The attraction was perhaps 
obvious: the “revival of the Caliphate gave each individual Muslim a concrete and tangible entity to 
satisfy his natural desire for belonging to something greater.”5  The goals may be abhorrent, the 




3 “The Return of Khilafah.” Dabiq, July 5, 2014, 3. 
4 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47286935 
5  “The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq, February 12, 2015, 57. 
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~ ~ ~ 
 
In August 1996, the 22 year old Julia ‘Butterfly’ Hill was struck by a drunk driver.  She was severely 
injured, with the steering wheel of her car penetrating her skull; she spent nearly a year in recovery.  
And this gave her plenty of time to dwell on the life she’d led:  
As I recovered, I realized that my whole life had been out of balance ... I had graduated high 
school at 16, and had been working nonstop since then, first as a waitress, then as a 
restaurant manager. I had been obsessed by my career, success, and material things. The 
crash woke me up to the importance of the moment, and doing whatever I could to make a 
positive impact on the future. The steering wheel in my head, both figuratively and literally, 
steered me in a new direction in my life. (Martin 1998) 
 
And she certainly found that new direction.  A few months after her recovery, in December 1997, 
she joined protests against the Pacific Lumber Company’s plan to clear-cut 60,000 acres of ancient 
redwoods in Humboldt County, California.  To prevent logging, she climbed nearly to the top of a 
200-foot tall, 1000 year old redwood tree; there, she constructed two rudimentary six foot by six 
foot platforms out of scrap wood.  She spent the next 738 days living on those platforms, 180 feet 
above the ground, enduring freezing temperatures, harassment by logging company workers 
(sometimes via helicopter), and other difficulties.   
What motivated her?  In December 1999, after two years in the tree, Hill spoke to reporters: 
“There’s no way to be in the presence of these ancient beings and not be affected… There’s 
something more than profit, and that’s life” (Dundon 2017).  
Hill descended only when, after nearly two years, the logging company agreed to spare her redwood 
as well as any trees within 200 feet of it.  But Hill didn’t end there: in following years, she has 
devoted her life to conversation efforts throughout the world.   
Reflecting on her time in the tree many years later, she said: 
I really do see so much in people. The desire to have something worthy of giving our lives 
to; because we give our lives to so much that really is not worthy of it. And I think even if 
people are not completely conscious of that, their spirits, their hearts, their souls feel it. And 
that is why we turn to self-medicating and numbing ourselves with shopping, over-
consumption, movies, television, drugs, alcohol, and all these things we do. Because there is 
something deep within us, even if we do not recognize it and cannot name it, that wants to 
have something worth giving our lives to. So something powerful about that arc of what 
takes the ordinary and makes it become extraordinary. (Taggart 2014) 
 
Hill focuses on the need to find something worthy of sacrifice and struggle.  She claims that the 
yearning for this is widespread, even when it is not consciously experienced as such; and we see this 
in the joy that comes from finding a goal worthy of devotion.   
~~~ 
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Putting oneself in danger and subjecting oneself to extreme conditions in order to protect those one 
does not know; fleeing the safety and security of a London suburb to join a violent war in Syria; 
living in a tree for two years in order to prevent logging.  What’s remarkable about these events is 
just how unsurprising they are.  It’s rare, of course, for people to go to these extremes.  But it is not 
incomprehensible, not shocking.  We’re not stunned by the fact that these people are putting aside 
conventional values in favor of something that strikes them as more important.  We have some 
sense of what the people are after; we have some sense of what they’re seeking.  They want 
something to which they can devote themselves, subordinating their comforts, their happiness, their 
pleasures.  They find different outlets: protecting freedom of speech; enforcing barbaric laws; saving 
trees.  The content is various but the form is the same: they crave something to which they can 
subordinate their mundane desires and pursuits.   
From one perspective these actions look manifestly irrational: why give up two years of your life to 
save a bit over one acre of trees, while the world experiences 70,000 acres of deforestation per day?6  
Why join a violent and oppressive regime, suffering from abuse and deprivation, instead of pursuing 
a comfortable life in London?  Why put yourself at risk of abuse and imprisonment to prevent a 
spot of land from development?  Why commit to these courses of action when the costs are so 
grave?  And why stay committed?  Why not give up the commitment when the costs begin to mount?   
Those are just three examples, of course.  Like any examples, they can be resisted, redescribed, or 
viewed as mere idiosyncrasies with no larger import.  But they are suggestive: they give some 
support to the idea that human beings—at least in some cases and in some circumstances—crave a 
form of devotion.  My hope is that the remainder of the book will convince the reader that these 
kinds of cases are ubiquitous.   
~ ~ ~ 
 
But how should we describe this form of devotion?  Here is the most obvious possibility: we try to 
identify the contents of the individuals’ pursuits.  We try to pick out what state of affairs the devoted 
individuals are trying to achieve.  And we say that the individuals value these states of affairs so 
highly that they’re willing to sacrifice lesser goods in order to achieve them.  So, the Standing Rock 
veterans value a form of freedom or defiance of oppressive government agents, and are willing to 
risk their own lives to achieve this; the British teenagers value the sense of purpose or meaning that 
ISIS provides, and will endorse violence and risk extreme dangers in order to secure it; Hill values 
the preservation of certain elements of the natural world, and will forgo conventional comforts in 
order to promote this goal.   
 
If we can explain the devoted actions in this way, then they would raise no special problems.  
There’s nothing especially mysterious about the fact that people weigh costs and benefits, forgoing 
some conventional pleasures or comforts in order to achieve things they regard as having greater 
value.  That’s routine.   
 
Yet I think this explanation is too easy.  It fails to explain a striking feature of the above cases.  First, 
notice that the individuals I’ve mentioned above are to some extent inarticulate about the contents 
 
6 The UN estimates that between 2015-20, the worldwide deforestation rate was approximately 25 million acres per year.  
See http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/ca8642en.  
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of their goals.  It’s not obvious that they first identify something immensely valuable and then decide 
to undertake sacrifices in order to attain it.  It looks like things go the other way around: they first 
seek something to which they can devote themselves, and then happen upon opportunities to 
express this devotion.  They choose particular ends for the sake of expressing devotion, rather than expressing 
devotion for the sake of attaining particular ends.  This is completely explicit in Hill and Emanuele and is 
strongly suggested in Begum’s self-descriptions.  But again the particular examples don’t matter.  
What matters is this: I will argue that people often adopt ends for the sake of expressing the 
devotion that these ends require, rather than first identifying valuable ends and then deciding to 
devote themselves to these ends.  Put differently: many people are more interested in finding an 
opportunity to express devotion than in identifying things of great value. 
 
That’s my first claim.  It can be understood simply as a claim about the psychological priority of two 
goals: does the person seek to express devotion, and then go about looking for a way to do so; or, 
conversely, does the person identify highly valuable things and then decide to devote herself to 
them?  If we understand the question that way, it will look like we have two psychological items, 
devotion and value, and are merely asking which typically comes first.  But I want to suggest that 
things are more complex: when devotion comes first, we tend to be dealing with a distinctive type of 
value.  Let me explain. 
 
 
2. A distinction among normative commitments 
 
It is a striking fact that our normative commitments divide into the trivial and the profound.  
Compare the normative significance that you place upon enjoying a nice cup of coffee with the 
normative significance that a violent white nationalist places upon establishing a racially “pure” 
society, or that a committed jihadist places upon establishing a conservative Islamic state, or that a 
social activist places upon protection of the oppressed, or that a devoted environmentalist places 
upon preservation of the biome.  We use the same term to describe all of these individuals, saying 
that they value certain ends or take there to be reasons to do certain things.  And yet it’s obvious 
that the normative significance that you place upon your morning latte pales in comparison to that 
which the jihadist or the nationalist sees in his action.  This is a perfectly familiar point: the actions 
that we label valuable or reason-supported vary in their perceived significance.   
 
Philosophers have offered ways of marking this distinction.  We can speak of the weight or strength of 
our commitments.  We can speak of their import.  We can order them lexically, saying that some 
always override others.  We recognize, then, that some commitments seem to be imbued with a 
special force.  They tend to override competing concerns; they tend to be fixed points in 
deliberation, which we refuse to compromise; in some cases, they are objects of passionate 
attachment. 
 
So we all recognize distinctions among our normative commitments.  It’s not news that some 
normative commitments are profound and others trivial.  But I want to ask a question about this 
distinction.  Does accounting for this distinction require anything more than the familiar 
philosophical machinery?  Does it require anything more than speaking in terms of the weight, 
intensity, or strength of the commitments?  I will argue that it does.  Our commitments do not sort 
exhaustively into the weighty and the unweighty.  There is another dimension: there is an important 
distinction between ordinary values and what I will call sacred values 
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In moral philosophy, it is commonly assumed that all normative phenomena are roughly on par.  
They are all weighable, perhaps with a few complications.  There may be some incommensurables or 
incomparables: perhaps we can’t compare the value of a Picasso with the value of the Grand 
Canyon.  There may be some normative commitments that are overriding: perhaps there’s an 
absolute prohibition on murdering innocent people.  There may be some things with lexical priority 
over others: perhaps considerations of justice ought always to outweigh considerations of pleasure.  
But all of our normative commitments can enter into deliberation as potentially weighable items, can 
be deployed as premises in reasoning, can be defended.  Insofar as they can’t be, they are 
problematic.  So, considerations that are exempted from deliberation, or that aren’t weighed against 
competing concerns, or that aren’t deployed as premises in reasoning, or that aren’t critiqued and 
defended in the usual ways—all of these will be problems.   
 
But there is a striking mismatch between these theoretical claims and the way in which our 
evaluative lives actually proceed.  Let’s illustrate this with a valuation that’s central to us: the 
valuation of human life itself.  Most of us agree that human life has great value.  But there are 
different ways of understanding this value.  The Catholic church holds that “human life is sacred 
and inviolable at every moment of existence” (John Paul II 1995: 61).  “The absolute inviolability of 
innocent human life is a moral truth” (John Paul II 1995: 57), so that “the direct and voluntary 
killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral” (John Paul II 1995: 57).  Peter Singer, 
by contrast, writes that “during the next 35 years, the traditional view of the sanctity of human life 
will collapse under pressure from scientific, technological, and demographic developments.  By 
2040, it may be that only a rump of hard-core, know-nothing religious fundamentalists will defend 
the view that every human life, from conception to death, is sacrosanct” (Singer 2009).  Both Singer 
and the Catholic church treat human life as immensely valuable.  But for Singer, tradeoffs, 
weighings, and balancings are perfectly fine: to use one of his examples, “We may not want a child 
to start on life's uncertain voyage if the prospects are clouded” (Singer 2009).  For example, Singer 
thinks it can make sense to decline to preserve the life of a severely disabled child.  According to the 
Catholic doctrine, which treats human life as having an inviolable value, this is perverse.    
 
There is a clear difference between the way in which the Catholic doctrine and Singer’s theory treat 
the value of human life.  Can we draw this distinction merely in terms of the weight of the value?  
Not obviously.  Singer and the Catholics agree that human life is immensely valuable.  Singer thinks 
that human life outweighs many competing concerns, and indeed that great sacrifices are often 
required so as to ensure its preservation: in a famous article, he argues that we are morally obligated 
to sacrifice much of consumer society—nice clothes, restaurants, homes, vacations—in order 
preserve human life by alleviating dire poverty (Singer 1972).  He believes that almost no sacrifice is 
too great for this: we ought to give up our incomes, our comforts, our security, up to the point of 
marginal utility.  That is, we ought to give until giving any more would make us as badly off as those 
suffering from lack of food, basic medical care, and shelter.  So there are limits, but Singer does 
accord human life immense weight.  The Catholic doctrine is, in that respect, analogous.  While 
professing belief in the inviolability of human life, the Catholic church does not treat it as infinitely 
valuable: it does, in fact, accept limitations on the quantities of other goods that must be traded to 
preserve or protect human life.7  
 
7 For example, consider these rules, taken from the 2009 edition of  Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services (which is a guidebook published by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops).  “56. A person has a 
moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate means of preserving his or her life. Proportionate means are those that 
 11 
 
Nonetheless, there’s a difference between the way that Singer and orthodox Catholics are 
envisioning the value of human life.  How should we capture this difference? 
 
We could say that whereas Singer assigns human life a value of weight W1, Catholics assign it a value 
of weight W2, where W2 is somewhat greater than W1.  This is true, but it misses the point.  There 
is a disagreement between Singer and the Catholics, but it’s not well captured by speaking of 
variances in weight. That would obscure the distinction.  Human lives and valuable and apples are 
valuable.  If Singer’s weighting of a human life is just somewhat lower than the Catholic doctrine’s, 
then Singer’s valuation of a human life plus a number of apples should, for some quantity of apples, 
equal the Catholic’s valuation of human life.  But this is absurd.  Even if we could, in fact, find some 
point at which these purported weights would be equal, we wouldn’t have revealed anything 
interesting about the disagreement between Singer and the Catholics.  (I am not denying that it’s 
possible to draw this distinction in terms of weights.  I am claiming that it’s inadvisable to do so; it 
doesn’t illuminate anything.  While there is a difference in weights, that difference is explained by 
something more fundamental.) 
 
So there’s not a good way of drawing the distinction between Singer and the Catholics merely in 
terms of the weights of the relevant values or reasons.  We might try to account for the distinction 
in other ways.  For example, the Catholic position involves deontological norms, whereas Singer is a 
consequentialist.  So we might speak of absolute prohibitions on using human lives in certain ways, 
where these prohibitions would be accepted by Catholics but denied by Singer.  And we’ll find some 
differences here.  But again, this won’t illuminate the difference.  After all, there are deontological 
views that allow human lives to be traded against competing goods: to mention one notorious 
example, Kant, the paradigmatic deontologist, argues that unwed mothers are permitted to kill their 
newborn infants in order to avoid “the disgrace of an illegitimate birth” (Metaphysics of Morals 336-7).  
So the mere fact that the Catholic position involves deontological claims doesn’t explain the 
phenomenon in which we’re interested.  The status that the Catholic doctrine is bestowing upon 
human life, while it does involve a deontological claim, also involves something more.   
 
We might describe this by saying that the Catholic doctrine treats human life as absolutely inviolable.  
Or we might focus on the way in which human life has a kind of sanctity, dignity, or meaning for 
Catholics that it lacks for Singer.  This, I think, is getting closer to the real difference, but these 
phrases are obscure; we need an explanation of what they mean. 
 
So there’s something here, some kind of difference between the way that Singer values human life 
and the way that his Catholic opponents do.  The Catholic treats human life as absolutely inviolable, 
and accords it a form of dignity.  It is exempted from material exchanges; it is not a fit object for 
tradeoffs; it is not to be bartered or weighed.  Moreover—and this is a point to which I will return in 
later chapters—human life is described in a way that is at least somewhat obscure: for what does it 
mean for something to be sacred, to have dignity, and so forth?  It’s not obvious.  Singer’s position, 
 
in the judgment of the patient offer a reasonable hope of benefit and do not entail an excessive burden or impose 
excessive expense on the family or the community. 57. A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means of 
preserving life. Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s judgment do not offer a reasonable hope of 
benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive expense on the family or the community.” Notice that 
“extraordinary” and “disproportionate” means of preserving life are not required. 
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by contrast, has the appearance of clear-headed rigor (though I will later argue that this appearance 
is deceptive). 
 
If this disagreement about the value of human life were a local curiosity, it would be of limited 
import.  But in fact these kinds of commitments are pervasive.  Empirical psychology has studied 
them under the headings of “sacred values” or “protected values”.  There are a number of cases in 
which agents seem to bestow this special status on particular objects of value.   
 
Psychologists typically elicit these judgments by asking people to consider tradeoffs.  Ordinarily, for 
any two valued goods, we can find circumstances in which we would trade one for the other.  I value 
happiness and I value money; but there’s some point at which I would trade an uncompensated 
night of happiness for a tedious evening accompanied by a quantity of money.  Most values operate 
in this way.  But there are exceptions.  Some individuals are unwilling to trade certain goods at any 
cost.  Consider cases such as these: buying and selling human body parts for medical transplants; 
buying votes for political office; prostitution; declining to offer insurance policies to members of 
certain races; auctioning babies for adoption; giving up part of a nation’s territory in exchange for 
peace; giving up an object of religious significance in order to end violence.8  Significant percentages 
of subjects refuse to engage in these tradeoffs regardless of the circumstances.  
 
Whereas most values are fungible, these values aren’t.  People won’t trade them for other values, 
regardless of the quantities involved.  Psychologists call them sacred values.9  We will examine the 
features of these values in more depth in the following chapters, but for now let me give a typical 
example of the way in which they’re defined: a sacred value is “any value that a moral community 
explicitly or implicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes 
comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values” (Tetlock et 
al. 2000: 853).   
 
I am not entirely happy with the label “sacred”: it obviously has religious connotations, and many of 
the things that qualify as sacred values have nothing to do with religion.  So the label is potentially 
misleading.  Unfortunately, the term “sacred value” is firmly entrenched in empirical psychology.  
Although I think alternative labels such as “protected value” and “higher value” are better, it’s too 
late to resist the standard label.  So I will use “sacred value,” hoping that the reader bears in mind 
that sacredness shouldn’t be taken to have religious implications. 
 
Some of the empirical studies on sacred values have the traditional flaws of social psychology: the 
studies are run on undergraduates, who are disproportionately drawn from predominately white, 
educated, industrialized, rich, democratic societies.10  Moreover, these studies often ask students to 
give quick judgments about cases which may be of little import to them (does an undergraduate in 
an introductory psychology class really have any stake in whether adoption of children is run by 
auction?  How seriously are they taking these questions?).  So we might be skeptical that real 
attitudes are being uncovered here.11 
 
8 These are just a few of the cases studied by Tetlock et. al. (2000) and Tetlock (2003).  
9 In addition to being nonfungible, psychologists often claim that sacred values have several other features.  I will discuss 
these below. 
10 See Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010), “The Weirdest People in the World?”. 
11 Some of the researchers actually share this conviction: Tetlock (2003) thinks that sacred values are merely avowed, 
rather than actual.  People are generally sincere when they claim that a value is sacred; but, when forced to choose, there 
are always circumstances in which people will compromise the value. 
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In an effort to counteract these problems, Ginges and Atran conducted “experiments using realistic 
hypothetical scenarios involving values that were central to the lives of our participants and their 
communities who were sampled from key populations involved in political disputes” (Ginges and 
Atran 2012: 278).  Consider a few results.  Jewish Israeli settlers (defined as people who choose to 
live in territories that Israel occupied after the 1967 war) were asked whether they would exchange 
land for peace.  Specifically, they were asked “Do you agree that there are some extreme 
circumstances where it would be permissible for the Jewish people to give away part of the Land of 
Israel?”  In their sample of 601 settlers, roughly half (46%) said no.  Ginges and Atran took this as 
indicative of a sacred value: after all, these individuals claim that there are absolutely no 
circumstances—in particular, no tally of human lives saved by an end to hostilities—that would 
motivate them to give away land.  And that’s not all: trying to sweeten the deal by offering additional 
material incentives (e.g., an end to conflict plus a donation of 100 billion dollars from the US to 
Israel) increases hostility and decreases the willingness to compromise (Ginges and Atran 2012: 279). 
 
In another experiment, Palestinians were asked whether they would give up the right of return12 in 
exchange for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.  80% said no, which Ginges and Atran 
interpret as indicating that “the right of return [is] a sacred value” (Ginges and Atran 2012: 283).  As 
Atran puts it in a related article: 
 
rational cost-benefit analysis says the Palestinians ought to agree to forgo sovereignty over 
Jerusalem or the claim of refugees to return to homes in Israel in exchange for an 
autonomous state encompassing their other pre-1967 lands because they would gain more 
sovereignty and more land than they would renounce. They should support such an 
agreement even more if the United States and Europe sweetened the deal by giving every 
Palestinian family substantial, long-term economic assistance. (Atran 2017: 73) 
But again, that isn’t the case: “the financial sweetener makes Palestinians more opposed to the deal 
and more likely to support violence to oppose it, including suicide bombings” (Atran 2017: 73). 
The values implicated in these cases are exceptional: they are uncompromisable and are held despite 
immense costs.  Of course, that alone doesn’t demonstrate that these values are distinctive: it may 
just be that one thing (such as sovereignty) is valued so highly that the costs of giving it up massively 
outweigh the gains.  But that alone doesn’t explain the second feature: tradeoffs and attempts at 
mitigation make things worse, rather than better.  That’s peculiar.   
 
We could try to explain away these cases by focusing on the particulars.  Maybe the “financial 
sweetener” makes the deal seem like a trick (the opposite side must really be desperate for this!); or 
maybe there are fears about the stability of the deal (they’re trying to make us more vulnerable!); and 
so on.  While we might question any particular case in these ways, the body of research is by now so 
large that it seems foolish to deny that this is a real phenomenon.  To give a sense of just how 
extensive sacred values are, I will mention a few disparate cases. 
 
 
12 The right of return is typically defined as the idea that both Palestinian refugees—defined as those whose place of 
residence had been British Palestine, but who were displaced in 1948—and their descendants have a right to return to 
what is now Israel.  Sometimes, the right of return is interpreted as including a right to the property that was abandoned 
in 1948. 
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In the United States, a prime candidate is gun rights.  Most Americans are happy to accept 
significant restrictions on freedoms in exchange for safety.  Few of us object to laws requiring us to 
fasten seatbelts and drive at posted speed limits.  Few object to prohibitions on purchasing 
explosives, toxins, and so forth.  In these cases, the reasoning appears to be a simple cost/benefit 
analysis: the dangers are so great that prohibitions are acceptable.  In certain segments of the US 
population, though, gun rights are not given an analogous status.  Suppose it could be conclusively 
established that prohibitions on gun ownership would save a significant number of lives.  Australia is 
often used as an example to support this claim.  After a mass shooting in 1996, Australia introduced 
certain restrictions on gun ownership.  Between 1995 and 2006, gun-related homicides dropped 
59%.  Given that there are somewhere around 34,000 gun homicides per year in the US, we could 
easily imagine restrictions on gun ownership saving thousands of lives.  Nonetheless, some gun 
rights proponents object that this would not be justified.  Here’s John McCain after a 2008 Supreme 
Court ruling that the second amendment protects an individual’s right to gun ownership: “Unlike 
the elitist view that believes Americans cling to guns out of bitterness, today's ruling recognizes that 
gun ownership is a fundamental right — sacred, just as the right to free speech and assembly.”  The 
National Rifle Association routinely promotes the idea that gun ownership is a sacred right; its 
bylaws state that it will defend the “inalienable right of the individual American citizen guaranteed by 
such Constitution to acquire, possess, collect, exhibit, transport, carry, transfer ownership of, and 
enjoy the right to use arms.”  These rights are treated as unrestricted and independent of the 
consequences: no costs are too great.  Even minor restrictions on these rights are treated as 
monstrous, as threats to the rights themselves.   
 
Another domain in which sacred values arise is certain environmental movements which oppose not 
just some, but all impacts on the environment. Earth First! is often interpreted as committed to this 
position.  Distinctive here is the absolute refusal to compromise the environmental values for other 
values—“no compromise in the defense of mother earth!” is their slogan, and acts of sabotage and 
violence are endorsed. 
 
But I don’t want these examples to give the impression that sacred values are isolated to fringe 
populations.  There are mainstream examples.  Human rights are candidates.  Consider the First 
Article of the German constitution, which begins as follows: 
 
(1) Human dignity is inviolable. To respect it and protect it is the duty of all state power. 
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as 
the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.  
 
Or take the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world” and “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”   Or 
John Rawls’ widely quoted claim that “each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override... the loss of freedom for some is not made 
right by a greater welfare enjoyed by others” (Rawls 1971: 87).  Dignity, rights, and justice are taken 
to have lexical priority over other considerations.  Regardless of how great a gain in welfare would 
be produced by acting unjustly, this is prohibited.  Tradeoffs are not to be entertained.  And the 
language of sanctity, dignity, and respect routinely arises in these contexts.  So, too, does the 
inchoate sense of meaningfulness. 
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So I am suggesting that when we examine social and ethical life, we find widespread commitment to 
a distinctive sort of value.  In the following chapters, I will analyze the structure of this type of value 
more precisely.  But for now, we can say that there seems to be a domain of sacred values.  We can 
initially distinguish these values by focusing on the way in which they are exempted from tradeoffs 
and held independently of costs.  Prospects of massive casualties, staggering environmental 
destruction, and crippling economic burdens do not sway people from maintaining commitment to 
their sacred values. In being immunized to tradeoffs, sacred values differ from ordinary values.  But 
not just in terms of this immunization; there’s also the fact that an aura of mystery surrounds many 
of these values.  There is an ethos surrounding gun ownership.  It is connected, sometimes in 
inarticulate ways, to a sense of identity.  And words such as “dignity” have a whiff of the portentous 
and ineffable; they are redolent and it’s not obvious what they mean.  If we substituted “life” into 
the first article of the German constitution, it wouldn’t have the same connotations. 
 
I want to investigate these phenomena.  What are these things that psychologists call sacred values?  
How should they be understood?   
 
Sacred values aren’t just things that are taken to be extremely valuable, for things can be extremely 
valuable without being sacred.  Sacred values aren’t identical to moral values, for the same reason: 
many of our moral values are not treated as sacred (though some are).  Nor are sacred values 
identical to commitments that are perceived as meaningful: things that are very meaningful, that are 
taken to imbue one’s life with significance, can nonetheless be non-sacred.  (I can view athletic 
achievement or literary skill as imbuing a person’s life with significance, without thinking that sports 
or books are sacred.)  Nor need sacred values be associated with religions, though they often are; 
environmentalist movements, the second amendment, political stances, and so on can involve sacred 
values.   
 
The presence of sacred values is most obvious when people maintain them despite great costs, as in 
the Palestinian/Israeli and gun-rights cases discussed above.  But actual costs needn’t arise; if we’re 
lucky, the costs will only arise in counterfactual circumstances. Thus, we sometimes need to consider 
counterfactual scenarios in order to determine whether a given value is sacralized.  And once we do 
this, many more sacred values appear.  I will return to this point in Chapter Three.   
 
For now, though, let’s just note that sacred values present a puzzle.  It’s not clear what, exactly, they 
are.  One possibility is that they’re nothing, or, more precisely, no one thing.  Perhaps the things that 
get labeled “sacred” are just a motley assortment of things that are objects of passionate attachment 
for some, considered meaningful for others, taken to warrant sacrifice by others, bound up with a 
sense of identity for some, and so on.  Perhaps there’s no unified class here. 
 
But I think there is.  I think we can single out something essential about sacred values and use that 
feature to uncover some important features of our thinking about value and the craving for 
devotion.  In the following chapters, I am going to argue that we can distinguish sacred values by 
their formal features: they prohibit certain kinds of tradeoffs, including merely contemplated 
tradeoffs; and they are invulnerable to certain forms of rational argumentation.  I will explain these 
points in the next chapter, but for now we can think of sacred values as inviolable, incontestable, 





3. Sacred values and devoted agents 
 
 
But why bother?  Why should we analyze sacred values?  People engage in all sorts of strange, 
foolish, and irrational behavior.  They display quirks, peculiarities.  Shouldn’t we class sacred values 
with these phenomena?  And if so, aren’t they a better topic for empirical psychological investigation 
than for philosophical study? 
 
I am going to argue that this would be a mistake.  In ignoring sacred values, moral philosophy 
operates with a distorted picture of ethical life.   
 
Although there are exceptions, a great deal of moral philosophy over the past century is concerned 
with the trivia of everyday life: should I keep my promise?  Should I tell a lie?  Or it is concerned 
with artificial dilemmas: suppose there’s an avalanche and my child and I are trapped in wreckage.  
Can I use a stranger’s body as a shield to save my child’s life, without that person’s consent, if doing 
so would crush one of his little toes?  How about if crushing two toes would save two lives? (This is 
an actual discussion; Parfit 2011, Volume I, pp. 222-31).  Left untheorized are the questions that 
drive many of us to moral philosophy in the first place.  Questions about significance, meaning, 
commitment; questions about the objects of passionate commitment; questions about what drives 
the jihadi, the nationalist, the committed proponent of human rights, the devoted environmentalist. 
 
And I think there’s a reason for this.  Philosophers assume that these are just more extreme or more 
complicated instances of the trivial phenomena.  If we can figure out whether we can compel toe-
sacrifices to save children, then we can figure out what’s going on with the commitments involved in 
nationalism, terrorism, and so forth.  We just have to start small, teasing out the differentiating 
factors.  We don’t start with the big questions; we build up to them. 
 
But perhaps not. Perhaps these aren’t just more complex, more extreme versions of the same 
problems.  Perhaps the focus on trivial and imaginary cases distorts ethical theorizing.  We start 
formulating our ethical theories and distinctions by considering these trivial cases.  We assume that 
the grave questions that animate our actual ethical lives will be answered in analogous ways: they’ll 
have more variables, they’ll involve additional factors, but at root they’ll be the same.  And I think 
this makes us incapable of seeing how deliberation and reasoning actually proceed in these cases.  It 
blinds us to the way in which our deepest normative convictions actually function.  We assume that 
these convictions can enter deliberation as rationally assessable, weighable points; that they can be 
defended in ways that are analogous to the way that the trivial concerns are defended; that they 
stand in need of the same kind of justification as these trivial concerns do; and that we can typically 
articulate them with at least some degree of clarity and precision.  And all of that, I will argue, is 
mistaken.   
 
But my conclusions won’t just be descriptive.  I won’t just be arguing that people do in fact operate 
with sacred values.  I will argue that there are ways in which they should.  After all, many 
philosophers will be tempted to think that whereas people do display the behaviors I’ve described 
above, these are pathologies, rational failures, things to be overcome.  Not so, I will argue.  It’s not 
just that philosophers have failed to notice sacred values and have thus given inaccurate descriptions 
of ethical life; it’s also that, in virtue of the distorted picture of ethical life, their normative claims 
have gone astray.   
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So, in part this book will be about philosophical ethic’s difficulties in acknowledging the existence of 
sacred values.  When I say that philosophers fail to acknowledge sacred values, I don’t mean that 
philosophers have explicitly denied that there can be any such thing.  Rather, I mean that 
philosophers have operated with assumptions that constrain the deliberative space.  As we go on, 
we’ll see that a group of apparently heterogenous phenomena—incommensurable values, lexical 
priority rankings, moral remainders, tragic choices, questions about importance and meaning in 
life—all of these, which seem to be at the edge of ethical theorizing, turn out to be related, to be 
manifestations of the phenomenon that I am investigating.  Moreover, central features of ethical 
theories—the way in which arguments for the core assumptions proceed, the aspects of the theory 
that philosophers focus upon—are puzzling until we recognize the role of sacred values in theories 
that fail to acknowledge them. 
 
In short: I think sacred values play a crucial role in ethical life and that our failure to recognize this 
distorts ethical theorizing.  While the real argument for this point is not shorter than the entire book, 
let me try to give some indication of how this is so. 
 
A central idea in many religions is that a satisfying human life requires wholehearted commitment to 
values or ideals that cannot be justified in the ordinary ways, that perhaps cannot even be fully 
understood.  These values cannot be justified by reason alone; nor can they be established by 
empirical inquiry; instead, they require revelation, or divine insight, or the acceptance of dogmas, or 
some sort of ability to limn the structure of reality.  So we need not just reason, but faith.  This is an 
exceedingly common way of understanding the difference between religious and non-religious 
approaches to life. 
 
Against this, many philosophers argue—again at a very high level of generality—that we can do 
without faith.  The most optimistic of philosophers believe that we can (or eventually will be able to) 
justify wholehearted commitment to certain values by reason alone.13  Others back off just a small 
step, claiming that although of course there will be controversies about particular goods, we can get 
overlapping consensus on a number of shared goods.14  Others tell us that we can detach our desire 
for rational justification from our wholeheartedness: we can live as “ironists”, or “free spirits,” or 
existentialists, who remain wholeheartedly committed to values that we freely admit are not 
rationally justifiable.15  And others think we are doomed to vacillation or fragmentation or anomie: 
we have to choose between wholeheartedness and clear-headed rationality; we can’t have both.16  
 
Depending on which philosophical position seems tempting, sacred values will look different.  
Sacred values do involve a particular form of wholehearted commitment: we are completely 
committed to them in the sense that they are treated as uncompromisable.  Moreover, they involve a 
particular form of dogmatism: below I will argue that we treat them as incomparable and as 
invulnerable to ordinary rational argumentation.  Finally, they often invest our lives with a sense of 
purpose or direction, and thereby give us a way of attaining a form of contentment with life.  So 
they have the features that many of us associate with traditional religious values.  But sacred values 
needn’t be religious; they are far more pervasive.   
 
13 Parfit 2011 is a good example.  But the aspiration is also present in many others: see, for example, Korsgaard 1996, 
Smith 1994, and Scanlon 1998. 
14 See, for example, Rawls 1993 and Berlin 1990.  
15 Rorty 1989, Kierkegaard 1841/1989, Camus 1955, Sartre 1948, de Beauvoir 1976, perhaps Nietzsche 1974. 
16 Schopenhauer 1844 and 1891, perhaps Nietzsche 2003, Benatar 2017. 
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In virtue of these features, I will suggest that sacred values enable us to stave off the forms of 
nihilism, anomie, and vacillation that I’ve mentioned above.  This is why they play a crucial role in 
ethical life.  But the sacralization of a value is typically premised upon the idea that commitment to 
the value cannot be fully justified by ordinary modes of rational thought.  I think this is true and 
important.  More precisely: I will argue that although we have reason to embrace some sacred values, 
we don’t have a good justification for picking any particular sacred values.  And there is where the 
need for insulation from questioning and critique arises: in order to fulfill their psychological 
function, sacred values have to be shielded from the effects of certain kinds of inquiry.  But this 
doesn’t mean that we need to seek some religious or metaphysical foundation for them.  Instead, it 
can just mean that we delimit the quest for foundations.  Nietzsche famously wrote that the ancient 
“Greeks were superficial—out of profundity!” (The Gay Science, Preface 4).  I will develop a version of 
that thought.  To lay my cards on the table: as you might expect from someone who has spent much 
of his career writing on Nietzsche, I am an atheist devoid of religious sentiments.  So the solution I 
propose at the end will attempt to preserve a version of the religious form without the religious 
content.   
 
In particular: I will argue that sacred values answer our demand for devotion.  Insofar as we are 
committed to devotion, we will be committed to sacralizing certain values; for mundane values 
cannot secure the most robust form of devotion, whereas sacred values can.   
 
Of course, we might respond to this conclusion in different ways.  Some will view it as a reason to 
abandon the quest for robust forms of devotion: if robust devotion requires sacred values, we had 
better learn to live without devotion!  Others will view it as a reason to preserve certain forms of 
devotion.  And others, still, might seek some kind of compromise or balancing of these desires.  I 
will explore these possibilities in the final chapter. 
 
 
4.  Plan of the book  
 
I pointed out that some of our commitments involve sacred values.  But, to understand this point, 
we need to clarify the notion of sacred values.  Chapter Two reviews the psychological and 
philosophical work on sacred values and related phenomena.  I argue that sacred values are 
commitments with three distinguishing features: they are overriding, incontestable, and invulnerable 
to certain forms critique.  In particular, we can analyze sacred values as follows. 
 
(Sacred value) Let V1 be a value.  Then V1 counts as sacred iff it meets the following 
conditions: 
 
1. Inviolable: if V2 is an ordinary value, then it is prohibited to sacrifice V1 for V2, 
regardless of the quantities of V1 and V2. 
2. Incontestable: It is prohibited to contemplate trading or sacrificing V1 for most or 
all other values. 
3. Dialectically Invulnerable: The agent insulates her commitment to V1 from 
the effects of justificatory reasoning.  That is, while the agent may think about 
V1’s justification, consider objections to V1, consider alternatives to V1, engage 
in thought experiments with respect to V1, and so on, the agent does not stake 
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her commitment to V1 on the outcome of this justificatory reasoning.  There is 
no dialectical move that would disrupt the agent’s commitment to V1. 
 
 
Chapter Two explains these features.  In addition, I review several other factors that are 
characteristically but not inevitably associated with sacred values.  These include certain types of 
emotions (such as reverence and awe); a sense of subjective import or meaning; and inarticulacy 
about one’s sacred values.   
 
With that, we have an account of a distinctive type of normative commitment, the sacred value.  But 
sacred values might seem paradigmatically irrational: isn’t it problematic to treat one’s values as 
inviolable, incontestable, and dialectically invulnerable?  Chapter Three argues that it can be 
rational to hold sacred values.  I start with features (1) and (2), the prohibition of exchanges and 
comparisons.  The commitment to sacred values conflicts with views according to which every 
normative consideration can be assigned a weight (you are forbidden to weigh or even entertain the 
idea of weighing sacred values).  Moreover, the commitment to sacred values conflicts with views 
according to which it is always problematic to refuse to compare things which are in fact 
comparable.  I explore how it can be rational to have commitments that exhibit these features. 
 
This still leaves feature (3), dialectical invulnerability.  Chapter Four examines the peculiar way in 
which sacred values are insulated from the effects of justificatory reflection.  I begin by introducing 
the concept of devotion.  I argue that being devoted requires treating one’s commitment to the object 
of devotion as dialectically invulnerable.  I further argue that it can be rational to manifest devotion, 
for the devotion is a precondition for the preservation of central features of ethical life.  If it can be 
rational to devote oneself to things, and if doing so requires treating one’s commitment to these 
things as dialectically invulnerable, then it can be rational to render certain commitments dialectically 
invulnerable.   
 
The arguments in Chapter Four turn on the idea that we need to treat certain commitments as fixed 
and immutable.  One way of treating commitments as fixed is by immunizing them from critique, in 
the ways that I’ve examined.  But another way would be by decisively establishing these 
commitments through rational argumentation.  Suppose, for example, that Kant’s ethical theory 
were successful: we begin with some undeniable facts about agency and then show that some 
analogue of enlightenment values follow from them.  If this worked, then we could do away with 
the dialectical invulnerability component of sacred values: we wouldn’t need to treat the values as 
dialectically invulnerable, because dialectic would decisively establish them.   
 
I think this strategy has no hope of success.  In Chapter Five, I explain why.  In essence, I argue 
that reasonable agents can always find good grounds for questioning their basic commitments.  In 
particular, I argue that there is a sense in which we are unable to justify weightings or lexical 
orderings of competing basic normative claims.  Reaching an all-things-considered ought judgment 
about what is to be done in a particular case typically requires assigning relative weights to 
competing normative claims; and yet, according to a view that I call Normative Weighting Skepticism, we 
lack sufficient justification for assigning these relative weights and thus are unable to reach all-
things-considered ought judgments.  Although Normative Weighting Skepticism rests on certain 
assumptions about moral uncertainty, I argue that it is a reasonable philosophical position.  I further 
argue that agents who accept Normative Weighting Skepticism will experience a motivational 
problem that I label Normative Dissipation: roughly, they will find that normative entities (reasons, 
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values, or principles) formerly treated as overriding cease to function as overriding.  Having sacred 
values is one way—perhaps the only way—of insulating one’s values from these effects and thereby 
preventing the relevant form of skepticism. 
 
Chapters Two through Five thus jointly show that it can be rational to have sacred values.  But 
sacred values are not wholly positive; they have their costs.  In the remaining chapters, I examine 
pathologies that can arise from defective relations to sacred values.  In being immunized from 
rational critiques, sacred values can foster and promote oppositional tendencies in individuals and 
groups.  In particular, sacred values can easily give rise to a form of fanaticism.   
 
Chapter Six examines individual fanaticism.  Several philosophers in the early modern period, 
including Kant, Locke, and Shaftesbury, argue that fanaticism consists in a certain type of 
dogmatism: one takes oneself to have an incontrovertible justification for some ideal but 
simultaneously insists that this justification outstrips ordinary rational standards, being based instead 
on personal experiences of divine communication, insight into the nature of reality, or some such.  I 
call this the Enlightenment account of fanaticism.  I argue that it is inadequate: while the 
Enlightenment account does identify one type of epistemic failing, this failing is not correlated with 
fanaticism.  So we need a new account. 
 
Chapter Seven offers that new account of fanaticism.  I argue that fanaticism is based upon a 
constellation of psychological traits including a form of personal fragility, group orientation, and a 
view about the status of values.  I argue that the fanatic is distinguished by four features: the 
adoption of one or more sacred values; the need to treat these values as unconditional in order to 
preserve one’s identity; the sense that the status of these values is threatened by lack of widespread 
acceptance; and the identification with a group, where the group is defined by shared commitment 
to the sacred value.  I explain how these features are mutually reinforcing and tend to lead towards 
the types of violent intolerance that we typically associate with fanaticism. 
 
In Chapter Eight, I ask how individual fanaticism relates to group fanaticism.  The simplest view 
would be that fanatical groups are groups all or most of whose members are fanatics.  But I argue 
that there is a more promising view.  According to my generative view of group fanaticism, a group 
qualifies as fanatical iff it promotes individual fanaticism.  But how, exactly, might a group promote 
individual fanaticism?  I explore the way in which certain kinds of group narratives can promote 
ressentiment.  Analyzing this notion of ressentiment, I explain how the production of ressentiment 
encourages individual fanaticism.  Thus, my account runs as follows: a group counts as fanatical iff it 
promotes individual fanaticism; a common (though not necessary) way of promoting individual 
fanaticism is by promoting ressentiment; thus, a common characteristic of fanatical groups is their 
tendency to promote ressentiment.  I argue that this account helps us to identify a disturbing feature 
of certain contemporary groups, movements, and political ideologies. 
 
Chapter Nine draws these points together.  We have seen that devotion plays an important role in 
ethical life; that devotion involves accepting sacred values, which are inviolable, incontestable, and 
dialectically invulnerable; that close examination reveals that sacred values pervade ethical and social 
life; and that sacred values stave off normative dissipation.  More worryingly, we have seen that the 
person who holds sacred values risks meeting the Enlightenment conditions for fanaticism; that, 
when the person with sacred values displays certain additional features, he does indeed become 
fanatical; and that fanatical groups encourage individuals to display these additional features and 
thereby lapse into fanaticism.  So we now need to ask: is there a way of holding sacred values 
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without risking fanaticism?   I suggest that there might be.  There are ways of rendering values 
dialectically invulnerable, and thereby enabling devotion, without lapsing into the most problematic 
forms of life that can be associated with sacred values.  For I suggest that there are non-fanatical 
ways of expressing devotion, ways that differ from fanaticism in that they enable the agent to 
recognize a form of contingency or optionality in her basic commitments.  I investigate whether you 
can be devoted through irony; through affirmation; and through what I call the deepening move.  
Each of these stances preserves a degree of flexibility and openness in the objects of devotion; each 
one tries to preserve a wholehearted form of devotion despite this openness.   
 
 
  
